Location aware self-adapting firewall policies by Tuğlular, Tuğkan
Location Aware Self-Adapting Firewall Policies 
 
TUGKAN TUGLULAR 
Department of Computer Engineering 
Izmir Institute of Technology 
Gulbahce Koyu, Urla, Izmir 
TURKEY 
tugkantuglular@iyte.edu.tr    http://www.iyte.edu.tr /~tugkantuglular/ 
 
 
Abstract: - Private access to corporate servers from Internet can be achieved using various security 
mechanisms. This article presents a network access control mechanism that employs a policy management 
architecture empowered with dynamic firewalls. With the existence of such an architecture, system and/or 
network administrators do not need to reconfigure firewalls when there is a location change in user settings, 
reconfiguration will be automatic and seamless. The proposed architecture utilizes dynamic firewalls, which 
adapt their policies according to user locations through the guidance of a policy server. This architecture is 
composed of a VPN client at user site, a domain firewall with VPN capabilities, a policy server containing a 
policy decision engine, and policy agents residing in dynamic firewalls, which map policy server decisions to 
firewall policy rules, at server site. 
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1 Introduction 
Maintaining security on their networks is critical for 
all corporations. One primary tool that every 
network needs is access control – the ability to 
carefully define and enforce which users have what 
type of access to specific applications, data and 
services [12]. When the network is contained within 
a single building, the problem is generally handled 
by a firewall. For corporate networks, which involve 
multiple interconnected segments distributed across 
various locations, the problem is hard and beyond 
node level configuration. To manage this kind of 
heterogeneous, distributed, and dynamic networks, 
system administrators want to focus on policy level 
management instead of taking their time for node 
level configuration [28]. Therefore, utilization of 
policy-based network management systems for the 
large scale networks is suggested [7].  
Policy-based management approach will help to 
manage information technology risks more 
efficiently because of the minimization of human 
involvement, hence less risk exposure, in the 
process of network security management. According 
to Corporate Information Technology (IT) Risk 
Management Model [24], policies on management 
level and procedures on functional level are 
necessary for a successful risk management. The 
risk management model matches the approach 
followed in this article. 
Policy-based management has become a 
promising solution for managing enterprise-wide 
networks and distributed systems. These are 
typically large-scale systems which require 
management solutions that are both self-adapting 
and that dynamically change the behavior of the 
managed system [6]. The main motivation for the 
recent interest in policy-based services, networks 
and security systems is to support dynamic 
adaptability of behavior by changing policy without 
recoding or stopping the system [6]. This implies 
that new mechanisms, which dynamically update 
the policy rules interpreted by distributed entities to 
modify their behavior, should be integrated to 
existing architectures. The ability to dynamically 
change, distribute, and enforce these policies is the 
key to robust corporate network security 
management [23]. 
In corporate network environments, where 
locations of users change frequently, it is desired to 
have network access control mechanisms that are 
able to adapt to these changes. This will provide 
users with more seamless, easy use services. The 
paradigm of tailoring applications, services, 
communication and connectivity to the user’s 
current situation and needs, is referred to as context 
awareness [9]. The goal of location aware user 
based network access control approach is to develop 
an architecture that enables the network access 
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control policy to be adapted to user context 
information, specifically to the location of the user. 
This article addresses the challenge of managing 
and enforcing a corporate network access control 
policies with respect to user and his/her location. An 
important aspect of this architecture is that network 
security policy management and enforcement are 
externalized from applications. This reduces effort 
and complexity related to maintaining and enforcing 
organizational policy, especially when information 
and related policies are distributed across multiple 
network segments [3]. 
This article presents a network access control 
approach based on the XACML [19] standards, 
which will be used for expressing access control 
policies based on authorization attributes and 
statements. Similar approaches exist in the literature 
[16], [15], and [8]. One of the reasons to choose 
XACML as the access control policy language for 
the architecture is that there is an implementation to 
support the XACML specification, known as Sun 
java XACML implementation [25]. It is possible to 
extend this open-source implementation to adapt it 
to context-aware access control [9]. In this article, 
introduction of XACML implementation is followed 
by the demonstration of the way to extend it for 
location aware user based network access control 
usage. 
For the enforcement of location aware user based 
network access control policies, the focus will be on 
firewalls as the network access control mechanisms. 
The challenge is for firewalls to know the right 
reconfiguration so that the appropriate security 
policies are upheld preventing illegitimate users 
from gaining access [4]. The architecture presented 
in this article also focuses on the configuration 
management of firewalls so that organizational 
network security policies can be enforced. Building 
a management layer for firewalls using policies 
enhances its value by making the management of 
the firewall technologies highly programmable and 
easily adaptable to different environment and 
security requirements [27]. Relevant network access 
control policies will be disseminated to the firewall 
policy agents so that they implement them on their 
firewalls [22]. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides an overview of related work. 
Section 3 describes requirements of a location aware 
self-adaptive firewall policy management 
architecture. The proposed architecture is explained 
in Section 4. This section includes main components 
of the architecture, the information model utilized, 
dynamic configuration scenario, policy decision 
making process, and policy adaptation process. A 
prototype implementation is presented in the 
following section with the operational values 
measured. Finally, the article concludes with some 
remarks and future directions. 
 
 
2 Related Work 
Yoshioka et al. proposed a policy based automatic 
network configuration mechanism that makes the 
configuration of segmented networks inconsistency-
free [28]. In their proposed mechanism, a policy 
describes the types of events and configuration 
messages a network element is to accept, and that 
policy is registered on a central policy server by 
each network element in the initialization phase of 
the element. After the initialization, all events and 
messages are sent to the policy server, and the 
server forwards them to appropriate network 
elements considering the registered policy so that 
they can reconfigure themselves automatically. With 
the introduction of a policy server, network 
administrators do not have to do anything to the 
network configurations, because policy server 
adjusts the configuration according to the changes in 
the environment automatically. They claim that this 
feature also expels inconsistencies. 
There is another work on policy based 
configuration of network elements using SNMPv3 
[18]. In their work, Omari et al. aimed to integrate 
the policy concept into the SNMPv3 framework. 
They proposed a set of rules to map authorization 
policies to the VACM (View Based Access Control 
Model) standardized as part of the SNMPv3 
management framework. Within their framework, 
Policy attributes are maintained in a configuration 
database local to the SNMPv3 entity and a new 
application is incorporated into the SNMPv3 entity 
to perform the mapping. This will ultimately allow 
manager and management applications to enforce 
enterprise authorization policies independently of 
the security model(s) implemented by SNMPv3 
entities. 
One other research on policy based configuration 
of network elements is presented by Kim et al. [13]. 
Their paper describes a technique relative to a 
policy based network security management system 
managing network security devices centrally. They 
presented a method using legacy devices that is 
already arranged and used at network within the 
Policy Framework. They claim that their method 
allows people to manage network security devices 
with small cost and effort, centrally and efficiently.  
Various frameworks, systems and architectures 
have been proposed providing context aware access 
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control and/or policy enforcement. Some of them 
are closely related to the work presented in this 
paper. Lymberopoulos et al. presented a framework 
for specifying policies for the management of 
network services in their paper [17]. Their 
framework supports automated policy deployment 
and flexible event triggers to permit dynamic policy 
configuration. In their paper, they focused on 
solutions for dynamic adaptation of policies in 
response to changes within the managed 
environment. They claim that policy adaptation 
includes both dynamically changing policy 
parameters and reconfiguring the policy objects, of 
which application to access control for network 
services is discussed in their paper as well. 
Kapsalis et al. proposed a context-aware, access 
control architecture, in order to support fine-grained 
authorizations for the provision of e-services, based 
on an end-to-end web services infrastructure [11]. In 
their proposal, access permissions to distributed web 
services are controlled through an intermediary 
server, based on a role-based access control model, 
which incorporates dynamic context information, in 
the form of context constraints. They claim that a 
high level of abstraction of the physical 
environment is achieved by using the concepts of 
simple and composite context conditions. Also, their 
paper proposes adequate mechanisms for updating 
context dynamically. They concluded with a 
presentation of an example use case. 
Han surveyed the recent researches about context 
awareness and context-aware security. Based on the 
survey results, the requirements of CASPEr system 
are analyzed and using the knowledge from analysis 
and up-to-date technologies the CASPEr model is 
designed. The CASPEr (Context Aware Security 
Policy Enforcement) model focuses on introducing 
context awareness into security mechanism to let the 
enforcement of security policy dynamically adjusted 
according to the changes of context information, 
consequently providing dynamical, advanced and 
seamless security setting. Furthermore, this model is 
applied on access control to let this security 
mechanism to be context aware [9]. 
Lorch et al. presented XACML, a standard 
access control language, as one component of a 
distributed and inter-operable authorization 
framework in their paper. Several emerging systems 
which incorporate XACML are discussed and using 
these discussions they illustrate how authorization 
can be deployed in distributed, decentralized 
systems. At the end of their paper, they presented 
some new and future topics to show where this work 
is heading and how it will help connect the general 
components of an authorization system [15].  
Giordano et al. proposed a visual policy 
definition hierarchy and a tool for specifying and 
implementing access and security policies based on 
the RBAC model to support network, system, and/or 
platform administrators in the management of 
resources. They represented those policies in 
XACML [8].  
Tuglular et al. proposed an architecture for 
XACML based management of firewall 
configurations in large enterprise networks. The 
goal of their architecture is to allow administrators 
and end-users to manage their firewalls, while 
enforcement of organizational policy is ensured to 
prevent unacceptable traffic gaining access to the 
private network domain. They suggested a method 
to represent firewall policies using XACML for the 
platform independent management of distributed 
firewalls [26]. 
 
 
3 Requirements 
The corporate network environment can be modeled 
as a network composed of multiple interconnected 
network segments distributed across various 
locations. There is an authentication server at each 
location, where corporate users are required to be 
identified and authenticated first, and then they open 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections to other 
locations, or sites, to access servers at those sites. 
Servers are maintained in a demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) at each site, which are protected by a 
domain firewall as well as an additional dynamic 
firewall. There is a policy server in the DMZ, which 
is responsible for automatic reconfiguration of 
dynamic firewalls so that a user logged into a 
domain, or a site, can access a server maintained at 
another site if he or she is authorized to do so. Each 
of these network segments, locations, sites, or 
domains, is protected with a domain firewall as 
mentioned above. The overview of this corporate 
network model is shown in Fig.1. 
In this model, a user is able to move from one 
domain or location to another and a server can 
provide services from any domain. After 
authentication, VPN client application residing in 
user’s laptop triggers the policy server, which 
reconfigures all the dynamic firewalls on the route 
of servers that the user is authorized to access. After 
automatic reconfiguration of firewalls, the user can 
access corresponding servers. 
A typical corporate network system consists of 
heterogeneous networks and servers running a 
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variety of applications and offering services to a 
large number of users. The complexity of the 
managed systems results in high administrative 
costs and long deployment cycles for business 
initiatives, and imposes three requirements on their 
management systems. Although these requirements 
have long been recognized their importance is now 
becoming increasingly critical [5]: (i) Management 
must be distributed in order to be scalable and so 
that it is possible to cope with the size of enterprise 
networks. (ii) Management procedures must be 
automated to reduce administrative costs. Manual 
management is expensive, furthermore the effort 
and time needed for management increases 
exponentially as a system expands. (iii) As 
networked systems are increasingly driven by 
changing business requirements, management also 
needs to be dynamic and flexible to deal with the 
evolution of the systems being managed. 
 
Fig.1 Corporate network model enables automatic 
reconfiguration of firewalls 
 
The requirements, which are also valid for a 
network access control system, can be facilitated 
with policy-based management approaches where 
the support for distribution, automation and 
dynamic adaptation of the behavior of the managed 
system is achieved by using policies. The main 
benefits of using policies are improved scalability 
and flexibility for the managed system. Scalability is 
improved by uniformly applying the same policy to 
large sets of subjects and objects, while flexibility is 
achieved by separating management from the 
implementation. In this way, policies can be 
changed dynamically, it is possible to change the 
behavior of a system, without modifying its 
implementation or interrupting its operation [5]. 
Assuming dynamic changes in user behavior and 
working with a network security management 
willing to adapt to those changes, the desired 
network access control architecture would have the 
following requirements [20]:  
• Flexible policy definition: ability to define 
policies that are either general-purpose or 
specific to particular user behaviors.  
• Highly secure enforcement: policy enforcement 
mechanism must be based on well-grounded 
security techniques.  
• Conductive to segmented network environment: 
policies must be enforced on any network 
segment.  Furthermore, policies and enforcement 
mechanisms must permit clients to move among 
network segments. 
It is necessary and possible to make the network 
security to adapt to the changes in user behavior, or 
context. The context information such as location of 
the user is required for automatically enforcing the 
network security policy. That means that the 
network access control configuration should be able 
to adapt to new user context. In addition, the 
security configuration process should be invisible to 
users. Users should not be bothered by applying 
security mechanisms before or during their 
activities. Therefore, the proposed architecture 
should have a mechanism to achieve the dynamic 
auto-configuration of network access control 
policies, or simply firewall policies. This 
architecture should be able to input user location 
information (i.e. user residing on specific host, 
domain, and network) and use it to trigger policy 
decision making process. 
In summary, the location aware self-adaptive 
network access control architecture should be able 
to satisfy the following requirements, which are 
similar or analogous to requirements delineated in 
[10] and [9]: 
• The users must be authenticated before 
receiving access to servers. 
• The users should be able to have access rights 
on different servers. 
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• The users should be able to access servers 
several times in a session. 
• The users should be able to login to the 
corporate network from different network 
segments. 
• Several network protocols should be available 
to the users to obtain services from various 
servers. 
• The architecture should be invisible to the users 
of the corporate network. 
• The architecture should be able to provide 
logged-in users with a connection infrastructure 
to servers they are authorized to access. 
• Servers must be protected from illegal access. 
• Users and servers should have previous 
registration for any access operation to be 
performed between them. 
• The administrators should be able to register 
users with their access rights and servers with 
their deployment information. 
• The administrators should be able to define 
network topology and firewall deployments. 
• Organizational network access control policies 
should have precedence over user access control 
policies. For instance, if a server is not allowed 
to be accessed from a network segment and a 
user who has access right to that server logs in 
to that network segment, then the user is not 
allowed to access that server. 
 
 
4 Architecture 
Traditional security systems lack adaptive security 
policies and enforcement mechanisms [21]. In the 
non-adaptive setting the set of policies is chosen in 
advance, before the server connection request is 
received. The adaptive policy enforcement 
architecture presented in this article selects the 
appropriate policies during the course of VPN 
connection operation based on the current location 
of the user. This architecture employs a Policy 
Server (PS) and a number of Policy Agents (PA). 
Each domain has a policy server to adapt network 
access policies and each firewall in the corporate 
network has a policy agent to modify its policy. The 
whole architectural picture is given in Fig.2. 
 
 
4.1 Dynamic Configuration Scenario 
The main principle of this architecture can be 
defined as centralized policy decision and 
distributed reconfiguration. In this semi-distributed 
architecture, the domain firewall initiates firewall 
configuration requests, then policy server makes 
network access control policy decisions and 
communicates with firewall agents to distribute 
necessary policy changes so that firewalls are 
reconfigured automatically. 
 
Fig.2 Location aware user based network access 
control architecture 
 
On-demand configuration requires the following 
algorithm [2], which assumes pre-determined policy 
is already deployed on firewalls. All the steps are 
performed automatically: 
i. adapt policy to current user location 
ii. deploy adapted policy 
iii. enforce adapted policy on firewall(s) 
iv. monitor user location changes 
v. return to step i when a change is detected 
The above algorithm becomes operational on the 
proposed architecture as follows. First, VPN client 
opens a VPN connection to the domain firewall, so 
that domain firewall becomes aware of the users 
location and informs the policy server as shown as 
step 2 in Fig.2. Depending on the user access rights, 
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policy server modifies high level network access 
control policy and deploys this adapted policy to 
corresponding firewalls in step 3. The policy agent 
residing on the corresponding firewall maps high 
level policy to machine dependent low level policy, 
which is actually the firewall policy (for some 
implementations it is actually a file). Starting from 
that point on, server client application, such as a 
web browser, can connect to servers that the user 
has access rights. When the VPN connection is 
broken the domain firewall notifies the policy 
server, so that it replaces the adapted policy with the 
original network access control policy and deploys 
to the corresponding firewalls. 
 
 
4.2 Policy Server 
In the core of this architecture lies the policy server 
which manages user location based access control 
policies. The following components, which are 
shown in Fig.3, are identified within the policy 
server: Configuration Request Point (CDP), Policy 
Decision Point (PDP), User access rights Policy 
Information Point (UPIP), Network access control 
Policy Information Point (NPIP), Topology 
Information Point (TIP), and Configuration 
Deployment Point (CDP).  
CRP is the entry point of policy change requests. 
PDP is the core of the policy server. It evaluates 
applicable policies, i.e. user access control policies, 
and renders policy decisions against network 
topology information to formulate new network 
access control policy. Policy and topology 
information are retrieved from UPIP, NPIP and TIP. 
CDP is responsible for enforcing the policy 
decisions through configuration change obligations. 
 
Fig.3 Policy server components 
 
 
4.3 Policy Decision Making Process 
This process is executed where the policy server 
makes policy decisions according to network and 
user policies using topology information. The whole 
process is described as follows: First, CRP sends a 
PolicyDecisionRequest message to PDP. Then PDP 
sends a PolicyRequest message to UPIP to obtain 
the user access rights policy for the user. UPIP 
returns a PolicyResponse message that includes user 
access rights information objects to PDP. In the next 
step, based on the information from UPIP, PDP 
sends TopologyInformationRequest message to TIP 
to obtain necessary topology information for the 
policy decision. Following this step, PDP requests 
from NPIP the policies of firewalls that are on the 
route to the servers, which user has rights to access. 
Then PDP evaluates policy statement using the 
information collected from UPIP, TIP, and NPIP. 
As a last step, PDP sends an XACML 
PolicyDecision to CDP.  
 
 
4.4 Information Model 
All the information points, namely UPIP, TIP, and 
NPIP, that exist within the policy server store their 
information in XML format. For UPIP and TIP, 
custom XML format is used whereas XACML 
specification is followed for NPIP. The details of 
each information structure are given below. 
UPIP holds user access rights with respect to 
servers, for which the proposed DTD (Document 
Type Definition) is shown in Fig.4. It simply 
represents which user can access which servers. The 
representation indicates that a user can access any 
number of servers, which is a valid assumption. 
Users are recognized with their VPN client IDs 
whereas servers are identified with their IP 
addresses. 
 
Fig.4 A DTD for user access rights representation 
 
TIP stores topology information mapping, which 
firewall protects which servers. Therefore, a 
topology element consists of one or more firewall 
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elements and a firewall element consists of one or 
more server elements. A firewall element has only 
an IP_AD (the IP address of the firewall) attribute, 
whereas a server element has three attributes: 
IP_AD (the IP address of the server), the Port (the 
port number it serves from) and the Protocol (the 
protocol it uses to serve). To represent such 
information, a DTD for topology representation is 
proposed here and presented in Fig.5. 
 
Fig.5 A DTD for topology representation 
 
NPIP is responsible for holding network access 
control policies. As mentioned above, Tuglular et al. 
developed a method to represent high level firewall 
policies using XACML [26]. XACML is suitable as 
policy description language because it is able to 
represent relations among firewall policies and to 
embed other information related to a firewall into its 
policy such as; firewall IP address, agent 
identification, implementation independent 
representation of policy rules and rule combining 
algorithms. The same method is used here for NPIP 
to store firewall policies. 
The XACML PolicySet element holds all the 
policies of firewalls deployed in the domain. The 
XACML Policy element encapsulates all the rules 
of a firewall policy and the XACML Rule element 
represents a single rule of a firewall policy. The 
order and action fields of a policy rule are 
represented as the attributes of XACML Rule 
element. The protocol information is stored in the 
XACML Rule Condition element. The src_ip and 
src_port information are held in a Subject element 
of the XACML Rule Target element. Similarly, the 
dst_ip and dst_port information are held in a 
Resource element of the XACML Rule Target 
element. The implementation independent 
representation of a rule is stored in the XACML 
Rule Description element.  
A part of the XACML file is illustrated in Fig.6 
given in Appendix. The part taken from the file 
shows the XACML representation of rule number 3 
of the firewall number 2. Examples on the XACML 
elements explained above can be found in Fig.6. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that IP addresses 
and port numbers are represented with regular 
expressions. 
 
 
4.5 Policy Agent 
Policy agent plays an important role in 
reconfiguring firewall according to the policy 
decision made by the policy server. In other words, 
firewall adaptation to the new context is enabled by 
the policy agent. In this article, firewall policies are 
adapted by using one of the ways explained by 
Lymberopoulos et al. [17], which is the adaptation 
by dynamically changing the rules of a firewall 
policy to specify new configuration for the run-time 
of firewall. This policy adaptation process is 
sometimes referred as mapping high level policies 
to low level policies in the literature [1], [18]. In the 
proposed architecture, high level policies 
represented in XACML are mapped to machine 
dependent firewall rules with the help of policy 
agents. 
 
 
4.6 Policy Adaptation Process 
This process runs after the policy decision making 
process finishes and an adaptation requirement 
appears. The whole process is described as follows: 
When PDP sends a PolicyDecision message to CDP, 
CDP decodes this message and prepares a 
ConfigurationObligation messages for the firewall 
agents. CDP sends ConfigurationObligation 
messages to the firewall agents, which are within 
the scope of automatic reconfiguration. Firewall 
agent decodes the ConfigurationObligation 
message, updates firewall policy accordingly and 
signals the firewall to load the new policy file. 
When firewall finishes loading the new policy file, 
it signals back to firewall agent indicating that new 
configuration is up and running. Firewall agent 
sends a ConfigurationUpdated message to CDP. 
When all firewall agents return back to CEP with 
ConfigurationUpdated messages, CDP sends a 
ReconfigurationCompleted message to PDP. 
 
 
5 Implementation 
The security officer or system administrator 
responsible for policy management needs a 
management console, where she/he can administer 
firewalls, servers and users and their 
interrelationships. A prototype implementation of 
policy server management console is shown in 
Fig.7. This console is designed in such a way that 
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when an item from firewalls, servers, or users 
categories is selected, the console shows interrelated 
items from other categories. For instance, as seen in 
Fig.7 firewall FW1 protects servers Server2, 
Server3, and Server4. When a server item is chosen, 
the firewall that protects that server and user(s) that 
has access rights to that server will be highlighted. 
 
Fig.7 A prototype implementation of policy server 
management console 
 
Same management console can be used to assign 
servers to a firewall and to assign servers to a user 
via the buttons on the right-hand side of the console. 
The prototype also includes a panel for firewall 
policy rules. When a firewall is selected, its rules 
can be seen in this panel. The last panel 
implemented in the prototype is the communication 
and processing log panel, which displays category 
item operations (i.e. adding or deleting a server), 
assignment operations (i.e. assigning a server to a 
user), firewall rule operations (i.e. updating a rule), 
and policy mapping operations (i.e. modifying a 
machine dependent firewall policy or configuration 
file). 
A domain setting with 10 servers and 2 dynamic 
firewalls, each protecting 5 servers, is selected for 
the experiment. Each firewall is assumed to have 10 
rules. While keeping these variables constant, the 
number of users trying to reach to the servers of the 
domain under consideration are let to range from 
100 to 500 with 100 increments. Their user access 
rights policies are randomly generated. In other 
words, the number and order of servers that a user is 
authorized to access is determined randomly. The 
average processing time values for a policy decision 
operation is illustrated in Fig.8. a policy decision 
operation starts with PDP receiving a 
PolicyDecisionRequest message from CRP and ends 
with PDP sending a PolicyDecision message to 
CDP. 
The experiment is repeated for 100 times for 
each user group. The values presented in the graph 
are the average of 100 values obtained for each 
group in the experiment.  
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Fig.8 Average processing time values for a policy 
decision operation 
 
The experimental setup, with 10 servers and 2 
dynamic firewalls in each domain and the number of 
users ranging between 100 and 500, is assumed to 
be realistic for a corporation. Even for 500 users, the 
average processing time for a policy decision 
operation is around 3 ms for an ordinary computer.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
This article describes a location aware user based 
network access control architecture which provides 
automatic reconfiguration of firewalls so that a 
corporate user requesting a VPN connection from 
any domain will have network access control 
mechanisms updated with respect to his/her server 
access rights when the VPN connection procedure is 
completed. The proposed architecture utilizes 
network access control and user access rights 
policies as well as network topology information to 
make a policy decision and then this decision is 
mapped to firewall policies through firewall agents. 
The whole firewall policy adaptation process is 
invisible to both users and servers. 
The proposed architecture has a lot of features 
that requires further development. One important 
future work is to include a secure policy exchange 
protocol between the policy server and policy agents 
that provides authentication, data integrity, 
confidentiality and access control. Moreover, policy 
decisions made on location awareness can be 
extended to encapsulate not only access to servers 
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but also type of access to servers. Location 
awareness can be incorporated with temporal 
awareness, so that they both can effect policy 
decisions. 
Although XACML 2.0 covers both core and 
hierarchical RBAC model, there is no publicly 
available open source XACML 2.0 implementation. 
Therefore, the access control policy mechanism is 
not based on a RBAC model. When XACML 2.0 
implementation is available, the proposed 
architecture will be extended to implement both 
RBAC models. In addition, the future focus will not 
only be on firewalls but also on proxies and the 
architecture is planned to cover privacy protection 
policies through NAT and VPN. Real adaptable 
systems adjust themselves through feedbacks from 
their environment. The types of feedback to be 
collected from network access control environment 
is another research area to work on. 
The lack of privacy may become the major pitfall 
of these context-sensitive systems [14]. Therefore, 
location-aware platforms should provide some 
privacy protecting functionality. They should not 
only focus on protecting the current position but 
also on the granularity of the protection means. The 
proposed architecture can be improved to satisfy 
privacy concern. 
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 Fig.6 Example XACML representation of a firewall 
policy rule  
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Fig.6 Example XACML representation of a firewall 
policy rule (continued) 
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